

HONG KONG TRUSTEES' ASSOCIATION SEMINAR ON

Investment Office Trust vs. Family Office Trust
24 October 2024



Agenda

- Overview Market
- Overview Family Office Solutions
- Investment Office
- Family Office
- Summary

Market Overview

Mainland Segment:

- 93,850 UHNWIs (>\$30 million)
- Total Value UHNWIs >\$2.8 Trillion
- +10,000 (est, yrly) intend to emigrate
- Projected 400 500 mainland companies will IPO in HK over next 5 years
- 90 (est) mainland companies have submitted listing applications
- Estimated AUM value \$9 to \$12.8 billion current listing applications
- 9,000 10,600 (est) UHNW mainland Chinese are resident in Hong Kong ■



Market Overview

Hong Kong Segment:

- 1,500 2,000 Family
 Businesses lead by founder over age of 70 yrs
- First to Second Generation Transfer:
- 50% 70% Failure Rate
- 30% 40% Success Rate
- 20% 30% "Cash Out" (est AUM \$75 \$120 billion) ■



Market Overview

The "Liquidity" Challenge:


- Wealth Dissipation / Erosion
- Family Conflict
- Lifestyle Inflation (Uncontrolled Spending)
- High Tax Emigration
- Poor Investment Knowledge (Network)
- Poor Investment Management
- Poor Investment Opportunities
- Lack of Asset Protection or Succession Planning
- Failure to Transition from Business to Financial Wealth
- Family Office Solution -



Family Office Solution

Principal Benefits:

- Financial Consolidation
- Central Investment and Wealth Management
- Central Governance and Decision Making Framework
- Benefits and Succession Planning
- Tax and Cost Efficient
- Low Tax Emigration



Family Office Solution

Two Principal Types:


- Investment Office
- Family Office 🖪



Investment Office

Principal Attributes:

- Founder Generation
- Nuclear Family (Spouse, Minor Child)
- Single Generational Planning
- Direct (Founder) Control
- Asset Protection
- Privacy
- Migration
- Administrative Consolidation
- Mainland Client



Family Office

Principal Attributes:


- Multi-Generation/Branch
- Multi-Generation Succession Planning
- Representative and Collective Decision Making
- Next Generation Development
- Philanthropy
- Collective Financial and Business Wealth (Embedded Family Office)
- Hong Kong Client



Summary

Two Principal Types:

- Investment Office Single Generational, Mainland Client
- Family Office Multi-Generational, Hong Kong Client ■



Investment Office

Agenda

- Reserved Power Trust (RPT)
- Trustee Investment Liability
- Trust Integrity and Functioning
- CRS (Mis)Reporting ■




Reserved Power Trust

Trustees Professional Fiduciary Company Settlor BETWEEN RESERVED POWERS TRUST Beneficiaries **Protectors** Investment Company Company Financial Account Bank Investment

Account

Reserved Power


Governance Framework



Dispositive

Powers:


- Power of Appointment
- Power to Direct Income
- Power to Direct Capital
- Power to Revoke



Semi-Dispositive

Powers:


- Power to Amend
- Power to Add/Remove Beneficiaries
- Power to Appoint/Remove Trustees
- Consent / Veto Exercise of Dispositive or Quasi-Dispositive Powers



Administrative

Powers:

- Investment Directions
- Bartlett Clause
- Change Proper Law
- Change Exclusive Jurisdiction
- Consent / Veto Exercise of Administrative Powers




Investment Control

Investment Control

Administrative

- Client Demand: Investment Control
- Principal Provisions:
- Reserved Investment Power
- Bartlett Clause
- Trustee Investment Liability:
- Zhang Hong Li vs. DBS Bank 2019 (**Zhang**)
- Ivanishvili vs. Credit Suisse Trust 2023 (Ivanishvili) □



Zhang Hong Li vs. DBS Bank Ltd

Facts

- Trust established in 2005, was designed to hold the sole share in Wise Lords, a private investment company.
- Trust contained comprehensive Bartlett clause. Settlor was investment advisor to Wise Lords.
- The trust became highly leveraged with significant exposure to AUD. When the AUD depreciated, the trust suffered considerable losses.
- Plaintiffs alleged negligent breaches of trust and fiduciary duties by the trustees (DBS Trustee) and corporate directors (DHJ Management) for approving risky investments without sufficient oversight.

FACV No. 2 of 2019 [2019] HKCFA 45

IN THE COURT OF FINAL APPEAL OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

FINAL APPEAL NO. 2 OF 2019 (CIVIL)

(ON APPEAL FROM CACV NO. 138 OF 2017)

BETWEEN

1st Plaintiff	ZHANG HONG LI
2nd Plaintiff	JI ZHENGRONG
3rd Plaintiffs	BRUNO ARBOIT and RODERICK JOHN SUTTON
(1st Responden	suing in their capacity as the current Trustees of the Amsun Trust)
4th Plaintiff	WISE LORDS LIMITED
(2nd Responder	
	and
1st Defendant	DBS BANK (HONG KONG) LIMITED
2 nd Defendan	IQ EQ (NTC) TRUSTEES ASIA (JERSEY) LIMITED
(1st Appellant	(formerly known as DBS TRUSTEE HK (JERSEY)
	LIMITED, NAUTILUS TRUSTEES ASIA LIMITED and
	FIRST NAMES (NTC) TRUSTEES ASIA LIMITED)
	in their capacity as the former Trustee of the Amsun Trust)
3rd Defendant	NAUTILUS CORPORATE SERVICES LIMITED
	formerly DBS CORPORATE SERVICES (HONG KONG)
	LIMITED,

NAUTILUS CORPORATE SERVICES (HONG KONG LIMITED)

DHJ MANAGEMENT LIMITED

NAUTILUS CORPORATE SERVICES LIMITED and

LEE KWOK TAI, PETER 5th Defendant
LIM LEUNG YAU, EDWIN 6th Defendant


4th Defendant

LIU HIU HONG, LINDA 7th Defendant

Zhang Hong Li vs. DBS Bank Ltd

Decision

- Trial judge and Court of Appeal found DBS
 Trustee and DHJ Management liable for
 breaches of their duties. The trial judge
 specifically noted that DBS Trustee had a
 "high level supervisory duty" over the
 investments, which they failed to exercise
 prudently.
- Court of Final Appeal addressed whether the trustees owed a duty of supervision despite the anti-Bartlett clause. The court affirmed the effectiveness of the anti-Bartlett clause and confirmed that there was no "high level supervisory duty".
- No allegation (Settlor) investment advisor engaged in fraudulent or dishonest behavior: just negligent investment management.



Ivanishvili vs. Credit Suisse Trust

Facts


- Trust established in 2005. The trust had assets of over USD 1.1 billion.
- Corporate vehicles, including Meadowsweet Assets Limited and Soothsayer Limited, were used to manage the trust's assets.
- RM embezzled large sums of money from the trust between 2005 and 2015. Fraudulent activities were uncovered in 2015.
- Trustee sued for breach of trust, claiming that the trustee failed to safeguard its assets.
- The plaintiffs sought damages of approximately USD 1.2 billion, alleging that the Trustee did not take steps to prevent or detect RM's fraudulent activities.

	Between) Bidzina Ivanishvili) Ekaterine Khvedelidze
(2)) Bidzina Ivanishvili
(2)	
	Defende

Ivanishvili vs. Credit Suisse Trust

Decision

- Trustee admitted breached its duty to safeguard the trust assets by December 31, 2008.
- Court determined Trustee should have recognized the risk of fraud as early as December 2006, given the RM's concerning behavior. By March 2008, the Trustee's failure to prevent the RM from accessing trust assets amounted to be a breach of its duty to safeguard the assets.
- The court awarded USD 742.73 million in equitable compensation. This was based on the returns the Trust would have achieved under a competent trustee.




Summary

Zhang Decision


- Breach of Duty of Care
- Bartlett Clause Effective Duty Modification
- Actual Notice AML Requirements
- Waiving Bartlett Protections Vicarious Investment Management (Trustee Corporate Directors)?
- Director Dishonesty Reckless Investment Activities?

Ivanishvili Decision


- Breach of Duty Safeguard Trust Assets
- Cannot Exonerate or Modify Fiduciary Obligation
- Bartlett Clause Not Relevant Actual Notice Misappropriated Assets
- Defective Investment Direction Provisions
- Investment vs. Misappropriation?



Reserved Dispositive Powers




- Reserved Dispositive Powers
- Reserved Semi-Dispositive Powers



Dispositive

Client Demand: **Substantive Control**

- Invalid Illusory Trust, Leading Decisions:
- MezhProm Bank vs. Pugachev
 2017 (Pugachev)
- Webb vs. Webb 2020 (Webb) ■



Pugachev

Facts

- Sergei Pugachev, a Russian oligarch, founded Mezhprom Bank, which went into insolvency in 2010. The bank's liquidator pursued claims against Pugachev for misappropriating large sums from the bank.
- Pugachev established five New Zealand trusts between 2011 and 2013. He claimed these trusts were set up for the benefit of his family.
- The trusts were discretionary trusts, with Pugachev named as a beneficiary and Protector. The trust assets included significant properties and other valuable assets.
- The liquidator argued that the trusts were invalid, asserting that Pugachev retained control over the assets despite placing them in trust.
- The liquidator alleged that the trust deeds did not divest Pugachev of ownership and control of the assets, asserting that the trusts were created to shield the assets from creditors rather than to benefit the named beneficiaries.

Before:

THE HON, MR JUSTICE BIRSS

Between:

(1) JSC MEZHDUNARODNIY PROMYSHLENNIY
BANK

(2) STATE CORPORATION "DEPOSIT INSURANCE AGENCY"

Claimants

and -

(1) SERGEI VIKTOROVICH PUGACHEV

(2) KEA TRUST COMPANY LIMITED

(3) FINETREE COMPANY LIMITED (4) BRAMERTON COMPANY LIMITED

(5) BLUERING COMPANY LIMITED

(6)MARU LIMITED

(7) HAPORI LIMITED

(8)MIHARO LIMITED

(9) AROTAU LIMITED

(10) LUXURY CONSULTING LIMITED

(11) VICTOR SERGEYEVITCH PUGACHEV

(12) ALEXIS SERGEEVICH PUGACHEV
(13) IVAN SERGEEVICH PUGACHEV

(14) MARIA SERGEEVNA PUGACHEV

(The 12th, 13th and 14th Defendants by their

litigation friend ALEXANDRA TOLSTOY)

Defendants

STEPHEN SMITH QC, TIM AKKOUH and CHRISTOPHER LLOYD (instructed by HOGAN LOVELLS INTERNATIONAL LLP) appeared on behalf of the Claimants.

HODGE MALEK QC and PAUL BURTON (instructed by DEVONSHIRES SOLICITORS LLP) appeared on behalf of the Twelfth to Fourteenth Defendants.


Hearing dates: 4th, 5th, 10th - 13th, 28th 31st July

HTML VERSION OF JUDGMENT

Pugachev

Decision

- Court ruled that Pugachev had not genuinely divested himself of control over the trust assets.
- Court determined that Pugachev retained effective control over the assets due to the powers he held as Protector.
- Powers Held:
- Power to Remove and Appoint Trustees;
- Veto Power: He retained a veto over key decisions made by the trustees, including investment and distribution of income or capital;
- Power to Appoint and Remove Beneficiaries.
- The court concluded that these powers were purely personal, meaning they could be exercised for his own benefit.
- Invalid Illusory Trust



Webb

Facts

- Case involved a matrimonial property dispute between Mr. and Mrs. Webb after their separation.
- Mr. Webb created the Arorangi Trust in 2005, holding various properties in the Cook Islands. He was the sole trustee, Protector and one of the beneficiaries.
- Mr. and Mrs. Webb separated in 2016, and Mrs. Webb initiated proceedings in the Cook Islands, seeking a division of the matrimonial property. She claimed that the Arorangi Trust was invalid and should be treated as part of the matrimonial estate.

[2020] UKPC 22 Privy Council Appeal No 0013 of 2019

JUDGMENT

Webb (Appellant) v Webb (Respondent) (Cook Islands)

From the Court of Appeal of the Cook Islands

before

Lord Wilson Lord Carnwath Lady Black Lord Briggs Lord Kitchin

JUDGMENT GIVEN ON

3 August 2020


Heard on 20 and 21 January 2020

Appellant Sean Owen McAnally Respondent Isaac Hikaka Tim Mullins

Webb

Decision


- Court ruled that Mr. Webb had not genuinely divested himself of control over the trust assets.
- Court determined that Webb retained effective control over the assets due to powers and positions held.
- Retained Powers (Sole Trustee and Protector):
- Remove and appoint trustees;
- Control trust's investments;
- Vary the Trust;
- Resettle Trust;
- Appoint Himself as Sole Beneficiary;
- Revoke.
- Largely personal powers, invalid illusory trust



Key Lessons

Trust Review

- At Risk Illusory Trust Jurisdictions: Hong Kong, Singapore
- Express Scope of Power: Personal vs. Fiduciary
- Offshore Trust Law Protections (Cayman, BVI, Channel Isles)
- Note:
- Clayton vs. Clayton 2016 (Clayton)
- La Dolce Vita vs. Zhang Lan 2022 (**Zhang Lan**)



Clayton

Facts

- The case involved a long-running matrimonial dispute between Mr. and Mrs. Clayton, focusing on the division of matrimonial property, particularly assets held within the Vaughan Road Property Trust (VRPT).
- VRPT was set up to separate business from operating assets, providing a degree of asset protection.
- Mr. Clayton was sole Trustee and Protector reserving the following **personal** powers:
- Power to Appoint and Remove Beneficiaries
- Power to Appoint and Remove Trustees
- Trustee Powers subject to numerous fiduciary disregards (exercisé powers in own interest)

NOTE: PURSUANT TO \$ 169 OF THE FAMILY PROCEEDINGS ACT 1980 AND S 35A OF THE PROPERTY (RELATIONSHIPS) ACT 1976, ANY REPORT OF THIS PROCEEDING MUST COMPLY WITH SS 11B TO 11D OF THE FAMILY COURTS ACT 1980. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION. PLEASE SEE HTTP://WWW.JUSTICE.GOVT.NZ/FAMILY-JUSTICE/ABOUT-US/ABOUT-THE-FAMILY-COURT/LEGISLATION/RESTRICTION-ON-PUBLISHING-JUDGMENTS.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND

[2016] NZSC 29

BETWEEN MARK ARNOLD CLAYTON

First Appellant

MARK ARNOLD CLAYTON AS TRUSTEE OF THE VAUGHAN ROAD

PROPERTY TRUST Second Appellant

MELANIE ANN CLAYTON

Respondent

Hearing: 1, 2 and 8 September 2015

Court: Elias CJ, William Young, Glazebrook, Arnold and O'Regan JJ

M J McCartney QC and K E Sullivan for First Appellant C R Carruthers OC and A S Butler for Second Appellant

DAT Chambers QC and JR Hosking for Respondent

23 March 2016

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT


- The appeal is allowed in part
- We set aside the findings of the Court of Appeal that cl 7.1 of the Vaughan Road Property Trust (VRPT) trust deed (the VRPT deed) is a general power of appointment and that the power is both property and relationship property, having a value equal to that of the net assets of the VRPT.
- We substitute a finding that the powers of Mr Clayton as Principal Family Member and Trustee under cls 6.1, 7.1, 8.1 and 10.1 of the VRPT deed (read in light of cls 11.1,

MARK ARNOLD CLAYTON v MELANIE ANN CLAYTON [2016] NZSC 29 [23 March 2016]

Clayton

Decision

- The court found VRPT was a valid trust.
 However, the court also recognized that the
 powers retained by Mr. Clayton allowed him
 significant personal control over trust
 assets.
- The court held Mr. Clayton's powers were so extensive that they were tantamount to ownership. As a result, the court treated these powers as relationship property, meaning they (trust assets) could be divided between Mr. and Mrs. Clayton.
- Offshore (Cayman, BVI, Channel Islands)
 Trust Laws Asset Protection Implications



Zhang Lan

Facts

- Plaintiffs obtained two Hong Kong judgments in 2020 concerning their acquisition of shares in companies beneficially owned by Zhang Lan.
- The judgments were based on negligent misrepresentation claims related to the acquisition. The plaintiffs registered the Hong Kong judgments in Singapore for enforcement.
- Dispute revolved around funds held with Credit Suisse and Deutsche Bank.
- Plaintiffs argued that Zhang retained effective control over the accounts, evidenced by her ability to transfer funds for her own benefit.
- Zhang argued that she no longer had beneficial ownership, as funds had been transferred to a company, held by a family trust (Success Elegant Trust) established for the benefit of her son and his children.
- Zhang was not a beneficiary, trustee nor power holder
 was sole director of underlying company.

IN THE GENERAL DIVISION OF THE HIGH COURT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE

[2022] SGHC 278

HC/OS 1139/2020 (Summons No 2703 of 2021)

Between

La Dolce Vita Fine Dining Company Limited

And

(1) Zhang Lan

(2) Grand Lan Holdings Group (BVI) Limited (3) Qiao Jiang Lan Development

Limited
(4) Success Elegant Trading
Limited

... Defendants

... Plaintiff

HC/OS 1140/2020 (Summons No 2704 of 2021)

Between

La Dolce Vita Fine Dining Group Holdings Limited

... Plaintiff

 Zhang Lan
 Grand Lan Holdings Group (BVI) Limited


(3) Success Elegant Trading Limited

... Defendants

Zhang Lan

Decision

- Court found that Zhang had retained beneficial ownership of the funds in the Credit Suisse and Deutsche Bank accounts.
- Despite transferring funds to the Trust, Zhang's conduct indicated that she did not intend to relinquish control. She continued to operate the accounts as the sole signatory and made significant transfers for her own benefit.
- Notable Conduct:
- Zhang transferred a significant amount to Metro Joy International Limited. This sum was used to purchase a condominium apartment in New York, which a U.S. court found to be owned by Zhang;
- After becoming aware of the Hong Kong freezing orders, Zhang made urgent transfers from the Deutsche Bank account, totaling US\$35,832,587.
- Valid Trust, Invalid Illusory Transfer
- Wider Implications, Application of Offshore (Cayman, BVI, Channel Isles) Trust Law Protections




Trust Integrity Community Property

Community Property

Private International Law: Matrimonial Domicile, Foreign Ownership Moveable / Immovable Assets

- Example, Community Property Jurisdictions:
- China
- Philippines
- Indonesia
- Thailand
- Vietnam
- Types: Absolute Community, Deferred Community
- Trust Firewall Protections: Succession | Divorce
- Slutsker vs. Haron Investments 2013 (Slutsker) ■



Slutsker

Facts

- In 2000, during their marriage, Mr. and Mrs. Slutsker purchased a property in London for £6 million.
- The funds used for the purchase came from a Swiss bank account held in Mrs. Slutsker's name. This account contained money that was considered joint family property under Russian matrimonial law.
- Following the purchase, the property was placed into a discretionary trust known as the Misha Trust, which was established in the Cayman Islands.
- Mr. Slutsker claimed 50% beneficial interest in residential property based on Russian matrimonial law, sought to challenge the validity of the trust under English law, claiming a resulting trust over half of the property.

Between:

VLADIMIR IOSIFOVICH SLUTSKER

Claimant Appellant

(1) HARON INVESTMENTS LTD (2) SUMMIT TRUSTEES (CAYMAN) LTD

Defendants Respondents

(Transcript of the Handed Down Judgment of

WordWave International Limited A Merrill Communications Company 165 Fleet Street, London EC4A 2DY Tel No: 020 7404 1400, Fax No: 020 7831 8838 Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)

David Brownbill Q.C. and Adam Cloherty (instructed by Taylor Wessing LLP) for the Appellant Gilead Cooper Q.C. and Richard Wilson instructed by Berwin Leighton Paisner LLP) for the Respondents Hearing dates: 20 and 21 March 2013

HTML VERSION OF JUDGMENT

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Lord Justice Lloyd


Introduction and summary

- 1. This appeal is from an order of Mr Justice Underhill sitting as a judge of the Chancery Division. He made the order on 17 September 2012, having handed down judgment on that day: [2012] EWHC 2539 (Ch). He dismissed the Claimant's claim, but he gave permission to appeal. The dispute is about the beneficial ownership of a freehold property, 3 The Boltons, London SW10.1 will call it the Property. In substance, though not in form, the dispute is between two Russian individuals, Vladimir and Olga Slutsker, who were married to each other from 1990 until their marriage was brought to an end by a divorce ordered by a court in Moscow in 2009.
- 2. The Property was bought in late 2000 for £6 million, with at least a further £1.5 million being spent on subsequent improvement works to it. It was bought as a family home, and was intended to be occupied primarily by Mrs Slutsker, together with the couple's son, Misha (born in 1999) and any other children they might have, of whom there is one, Anna, born in 2003. The purchase was taken in the name of the First Defendant, Haron Investments Ltd (Haron), originally as nominee for Mrs Slutsker. Before long, as had been contemplated, Mrs Slutsker caused Haron to hold the beneficial interest in the Property upon trust for the trustee of a discretionary trust, called the Misha

Slutsker

Decision

- The court determined Mr. Slutsker knew and consented to the Trust and had nevertheless failed to object within the time limits prescribed by Russian law.
- Court rejected argument that a resulting trust arose under English law, in which he would hold a 50% beneficial interest in the property. The court emphasized that Russian law governed the parties' rights, and Russian law did not support such a resulting trust claim.




Trust Integrity Survivability


Survivability

Settlor Failure

- Standard Trust Provisions:
- Settlor Death or Incapacity
- Typical Drafting **Failure**:
- Settlor Unaccountable
- Settlor Incarcerated
- Settlor Duress
- Substitute Provisions:
- Automatic Settlor Retirement
- "Fit-and-Proper" Successor Protector
- Restricted Investment Scope
- Investment Company "Fit-and-Proper" Successor Directors ■




Investment Entity Trust




Investment Entity Trust

- Part B "Managed Entity" Test:
- Trust Holds Financial Assets
- Gross Income (>50%)
 Investing, Reinvesting or Trading Financial Assets
- Managed by FinancialInstitution




Investment Entity Trust

- Part A "Managing Entity" Test:
- Entity conducts investment business (investing, administering or managing Financial Assets or money)
- Gross (>50%) income attributable to investment business



Common Errors

- No Trust Income (run-dry-structure)
- Reserved Investment Power vs.
 "Managed By Test"
- Review whether Trust Deed contains modern "Pervasive Investment Power" or simple "Power to Issue Investment Directions" from time to time
- Pervasive Investment Power: Trustee has no Investment Powers while Settlor / Protector in Office



Pervasive Investment Power


subparagraph A(6)(a). An Entity is "managed by" another Entity if the managing Entity performs, either directly or through another service provider, any of the activities or operations described in subparagraph A(6)(a) on behalf of the managed Entity. However, an Entity does not manage another Entity if it does not have discretionary authority to manage the Entity's assets (in whole or part). Where an Entity is managed by a mix of Financial Institutions,

CRS Commentary pg. 162 para 17 IRD Guidance, Ch 3, para 35

Pervasive Investment Power

Common Errors

- Managing Entity (Trustee):
- No discretionary authority to manage assets of the Trust – Administrative Power
- Reserved Power Holder not an "Entity"
- No other Financial Institution discretionarily managing assets of Trust
- Underlying Investment Company, Separate Entity.



Summary

- Bartlett Protections Work in Progress
- Reckless Investment Decisions may be tantamount to Dishonesty
 Seek Directions
- Overloaded Reserved Powers may invalidate the Trust, avoid HK and SG Trust Law if extensive Reserved Powers (US FGTs?)
- Use of Offshore Trust Laws may Result in Assignable Trust Assets – Asset Protection Implications
- Totally review CRS reporting of Reserved Investment Power Trusts
 High Levels of Misreporting





Family Office

Agenda


- Private Trust Company Structure
- Guarantee PTC vs. Purpose Trust
- Governance Structure
- Director "Dog Leg" Claims
- PTC Structure Integrity
- CRS Reporting








Governance Framework




Guarantee Company




Guarantee Company

- No Shareholders, No Share Capital
- No Shareholder Succession or Probate
- Guarantee Members
- Guarantee Nominal Sum –Liability Protection
- Member Governance and Control
- Simple and Cost Effective
- Public Document
- Cannot Entrench Constitutional Provisions




Purpose Trust PTC Structure




Purpose Trust

- "Orphan" PTC Shares No Probate
- Purpose Trust Corporate Governance Rules (PTC Director Rules)
- Entrenched and Enforced
- Private (Purpose Trust Deed)
- Complex and Costly
- Multi-Jurisdictional




Governance Structure




Enforcer Governance:

- Source: Purpose Trust Deed
- Appointment
- Removal
- Renumeration
- Professional Enforcer
- Fixed vs. Discretionary Governance Rules
- Enforcer Governance Role




PTC Director Governance:

- Source: Purpose Trust Deed / PTC M&As
- Director Appointment
- Director Removal
- Director Renumeration
- Independent PTC Director Criteria, Board Composition
- Fixed vs. Discretionary
 Governance Rules




Investment Co Director Governance:

- Source: Family Trust / Invest Co M&As
- Director Appointment
- Director Removal
- Director Renumeration
- Independent Director Criteria, Board Composition
- Fixed vs. Discretionary Governance Rules



Co-Governance Rules:

- Source: Family Trust / Invest Co M&As
- PTC Trustee Consent:
- Investment Policy Statement
- Private Equity Investments
- Swaps, futures, forwards, derivative contracts
- Significant Borrowing / Lending
- Significant Disposal
- Connected Party Transaction
- Significant Litigation
- Dividend Policy / Distribution




'Dog Leg' Liability

PTC Director Liability

Dog Leg Claim:

- A "dog leg" claim is an indirect claim brought by beneficiaries against the directors of a PTC.
- The idea is that the PTC itself may have a claim against its own directors for breach of fiduciary duty or negligence, and the beneficiaries are asserting that this claim should be enforced indirectly to recover damages for the trust or the beneficiaries.
- Courts are reluctant to allow "dog leg" claims because they can undermine the independence of the PTC and complicate the legal relationship between the trustee, the directors, and the beneficiaries.
- McGaughey v Universities Superannuation Scheme Ltd [2023] (para 90):




McGaughey v Universities Superannuation Scheme Limited [2023] EWCA Civ 873

90. Dog-leg claims are dependent, therefore, upon whether the chose in action in relation to the breaches of duty by the directors is held by the trustee company on trust for the beneficiaries. Whether such a claim is arguable will turn upon the facts of the case. But as *Lewin* explains at 43-067, where the trustee company is a one trust, no asset company, created solely for the purpose of administering the trust in question, it is not unarguable that the company's claims against the directors may be held on trust, opening up the possibility of a dog-leg claim.

PTC Structure Integrity

PTC Governance Structure




Integrity

Invalid Illusory Trust

- Pugachev
- Webb
- Zhang Lan


Assignable Interest

Clayton




CRS Reporting


CRS Analysis




Purpose Trust Analysis



Family Trust Analysis



PTC Central Analysis




Purpose Trust

Key Considerations

- Managed Type B Investment Entity Trust:
- Holds Financial Assets
- >50 Gross Investment Income
- Managed by Financial Institution (Licensed Trustee)

Principal Test Failure:

- No Gross Income
- Purpose to "Hold" Shares PTC
- No Discretionary Authority to Manage Assets of Trust
- PTC "Trading" Subsidiary (Deemed Active NFE Trust Section VIII, D, 9 (d) CRS / Section VIII, A, 6 CRS) ■




Family Trust

Key Considerations

- Managed Type B Investment Entity Trust:
- Holds Financial Assets
- >50% Gross Investment Income
- Managed by "Financial Institution"
- PTC "Managing Entity"
- Conducts Investment Activities
- >50% Gross Income Attributed to Conducting Investment Activities

Principal Test Failure:


- No Income
- Pervasive Reserved Investment Power to Settlor (Protector) Not "Managed By"



PTC Status

Key Consideration

- If PTC satisfies "Type A Managing Entity" status (Financial Institution) Purpose Trust cannot be a Deemed Active NFE (Subsidiary PTC qualify as Financial Institution CRS Section VIII, D, 9, (d)).
- If PTC does not satisfy "Managing Entity" status (Not Financial Institution) Purpose Trust may be a Deemed Active NFE.



Summary

- Where a multi-generation family require complex representative governance rules a PTC/Purpose Structure is appropriate
- Governance rules are designed to cover four key areas: control, participation, benefit and abuse
- The courts generally resist Dog-Leg claims, but in an appropriate case (SPV PTC) they may finally enforce a direct beneficiary claim against PTC Directors
- PTCs are not a substitute for Reserved Investment Power Trusts, a Settlor Controlled PTC is an Illusory Trust Risk
- CRS Reporting is complex and requires each level of a PTC structure to be separately assessed and then interrelated



Key Lessons

- Two separate client segments: Mainland Chinese and Hong Kong Business Families
- Requires Two Different Approaches and Two Different Solutions
- Investment Trusts Aggressive Reserved Powers, No Effective"Plan B"
- Family Office Trusts Inadequate Governance Framework
- Investment and Family Office Segments will Continue to Grow, We have much Work to Do!



